I grew up listening to slightly damaged vinyl and adults who thought the world had peaked in moral clarity. That feeling — the stubborn belief that one era contains the single truest way of living — is older than any of us. Still, when you ask for a clear comparison between the people who came of age in the 1960s and 1970s and those who live now the temptation is to gossip or moralise. I wanted something firmer: science backed differences between the 60s–70s generation and today. What follows mixes data, a few uncomfortable opinions, and the sort of loose observations a columnist keeps in her back pocket.
Why the comparison matters more than nostalgia
We often talk about generations as if they were clearly separated islands; historians and statisticians know better. Cohort effects mingle with life stage effects and period effects. Still, cohorts raised under certain institutions technologies and social pressures carry distinctive marks into adulthood. The people who were young in the 1960s and 1970s did so under very different labour markets family systems and public infrastructures than people born after 1990. Those structural differences show up in health education and behaviour. I am not declaring one era morally superior. I am saying that some deep material shifts altered how people live and age.
Longevity and early life conditions
At first glance longevity sounds like a straight win for modernity: people live longer now. But the story is richer and a touch ugly. Researchers such as Sir Michael Marmot have long argued that life expectancy is entangled with the social determinants of health. Those determinants are not a minor footnote; they shape entire life courses. The generation that matured in the 60s and 70s often entered adulthood when public services housing and stable defined benefit pensions offered predictable scaffolding. That reduced early life stressors which show up in later morbidity.
Health inequalities and the social determinants of health are not a footnote to the determinants of health. They are the main issue.
To put it plainly modern cohorts often have better survival rates from acute causes but face rising chronic burdens that map closely onto inequality. That is an important science backed difference not obvious at a dinner party.
Mental health and social wiring
Here the data is vivid and uncomfortable. Contemporary research into adolescent mental health shows steep changes once smartphones and social media became universal. Jean Twenge and colleagues charted shifts in reported depressive symptoms social patterns and risk behaviours after the early 2010s. Her phrasing is stark and worth repeating when we weigh cultural change against clinical outcomes.
It is not an exaggeration to describe iGen as being on the brink of the worst mental health crisis in decades. Much of this deterioration can be traced to their phones.
That is science backed but contested. Meta analyses do not uniformly confirm causation; nuances matter. Still one clear pattern emerges: time spent in face to face unstructured social play declined in recent cohorts while solitary screen engagement rose. Those shifts correlate with increased anxiety and loneliness measurements especially among younger women. That does not mean phones alone destroyed anything. It means a new social ecology formed where certain harms increased and certain risks receded.
Work routines and the reward structure
People who entered labour markets in the late 60s and 70s often experienced linear career paths stronger union protections and clearer progression. Economic history and labour economics papers show that real wage growth and mobility were higher for many mid 20th century cohorts during early adulthood. Today career paths are fragmented by gig labour precarious rents and credential inflation. This is not moralising: it is measurable. The Office for National Statistics and longitudinal cohort studies demonstrate that recent cohorts face slower income growth earlier in life and more housing insecurity.
I take a non neutral position here. The modern emphasis on flexibility has been sold as liberation but often functions as precarity with the vocabulary of freedom stitched over it. That matters in mental health in family formation and in choices that ripple into midlife.
How the childhood we remember differs from the childhood of today
People of the 60s and 70s sometimes recall a childhood with more unsupervised play and more local social networks. That memory is not mere nostalgia. Social capital in local neighbourhoods was denser for many communities then which supported different developmental skills. Contemporary children may be safer from certain physical risks yet spend less time learning conflict resolution in face to face groups. The science backed difference is: the learning environment changed from mutual neighbourhood practice to curated digital publics and institutionalised extracurriculars.
Education and cognitive demands
Education systems expanded in the postwar era. People who were young in the 60s and 70s faced a different academic gatekeeping system than today. Rising participation in higher education and later entry into labour markets mean modern cohorts accumulate more formal credentials but often at the cost of delayed economic independence. Cognitive demands changed too: modern jobs prize continuous digital attention the ability to process streams of information and rapid context switching. That looks like progress until you factor in attention fragmentation and burnout patterns in recent adults.
Culture and values: slower drift than you think
Despite sweeping differences the broad structure of values often drifts rather than flips. Issues like fairness tolerance and cultural pluralism evolved across decades but not in a single leap. People from the 60s and 70s who embraced counterculture sometimes became the pragmatic elders who built institutions. Meanwhile younger cohorts adopt progressive frames yet remain pragmatically conservative about personal risk. That ambivalence is a science backed pattern in attitudinal surveys: values shift but behaviours lag or layer unpredictably.
What this means for conversations across generations
First, stop pretending differences are purely moral. Many are structural and measurable. Second, if you want to change outcomes for people now you do not need platitudes you need policies that address early life conditions mental health ecosystems and fragile labour markets. Third, be generous in private and rigorous in public: this era produces skills older cohorts did not have and older cohorts developed resilience modern systems sometimes erode.
I will end this with an unfinished thought because generational study benefits from a bit of humility: knowing what changed is only useful if we pay attention to who pays the cost. Sometimes the past looks better because the bills were hidden. Sometimes the present looks worse because we can see the bills and the balance sheet is painfully transparent. The work of comparing cohorts is not about scoring points; it is about noticing which systems amplify flourishing and which erode it.
Summary Table
| Domain | 60s–70s Generation | Today |
|---|---|---|
| Health and longevity | Stable public scaffolding lower early life stress for many | Longer acute survival but rising chronic burdens tied to inequality |
| Mental health | Different stressors lower recorded adolescent depression rates | Higher reported anxiety and depression among youth correlated with screen use |
| Work and income | Clearer linear progression stronger union protection | Fragmented careers precarious early incomes credential pressures |
| Social life | Denser local networks more unsupervised play | Curated digital publics less unsupervised in person socialising |
| Education | Gatekept fewer degrees earlier work entry | Mass higher education later economic independence new cognitive demands |
FAQ
Are these differences universal across the UK?
No. The patterns described reflect broad cohort and structural trends but vary by region class race and rural or urban context. For example areas with stronger local economies retained mid century career trajectories longer. The science backed differences are most visible when aggregated across representative longitudinal cohorts but local realities can contradict the national average. Treat the general comparison as framing not destiny.
Does technology explain everything?
No. Technology is a major catalyst especially for social wiring and attention economics but it is not the whole story. Economic policy housing supply child care availability and the shape of labour markets all interact. Think of technology as a strong amplifier not a sole cause. Where austerity or policy gaps exist technology’s harms or benefits can be magnified or muted.
Which generation is better off financially?
On average the 60s and 70s cohorts experienced stronger early adulthood income growth and easier routes into home ownership during certain decades. Recent cohorts face slower wage growth higher housing costs and greater student debt burdens. That does not mean every modern individual is worse off but as a statistical cohort many face greater economic precarity earlier in life.
Should we aim to recreate the 60s–70s systems?
I would not advocate copying any past era wholesale. Many social rules of the mid 20th century were unjust or exclusionary. The sensible route is selective restoration: identify public supports that reduced early life stress and rebuild them for inclusive modern societies. Combine that with a sober acceptance of technological realities and better regulation of precarious labour.
How should readers use this article?
Use it to reframe family conversations policy debates and workplace norms. When someone says young people are weak or old people are rigid point to the structures that shape behaviour. If you are a policymaker activist or family member start with the science backed differences and ask which levers change outcomes not merely narratives.
Yes this is imperfect and partial. That is the point. Life and history are messy and the better we accept that the more useful our arguments become.
